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Monitoring the breathing air in tritium facility rooms 
for airborne tritium is a radiological safety requirement 
and a best practice for personnel safety. Besides audible 
alarms for room evacuation, these monitors often send 
signals for process shutdown, ventilation isolation, and 
cleanup system actuation to mitigate releases and prevent 
tritium spread to the environment. Therefore, these 
monitors are important not only to personnel safety but 
also to public safety and environmental protection. This 
paper presents an operating experience review of tritium 
monitor performance on demand during small (1 mCi to 
1 Ci) operational releases, and intentional airborne in-
room tritium release tests. The tritium tests provide 
monitor operation data to allow calculation of a 
statistical estimate for the reliability of monitors
annunciating in actual tritium gas airborne release 
situations. The data show a failure to operate rate of 
3.5E06/monitor-hr with an upper bound of 4.7E06, a
failure to alarm on demand rate of 1.4E02/demand with 
an upper bound of 4.4E02, and a spurious alarm rate of 
0.1 to 0.2/monitor-yr.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personnel exposure monitoring is a fundamental 
safety precaution for a variety of airborne substances. 
Because fusion experiments tend toward use of kg 
quantities of tritium fuel, there is a chance that tritium can 
be released into the building atmosphere. Fixed point 
tritium air monitors are part of the protection scheme for 
personnel working with or near tritium fuel.
There are generally three failures of concern for 
tritium monitors: the failure to monitor, the failure to 
sound an alarm when required, and sounding a spurious 
alarm when no alarm condition exists. These failures are 
typically referred to as failure to operate or failure to 
function, failure to alarm on demand, and spurious alarm. 
All alarm systems have requirements or best practice 
standards that state the monitors must have high 
reliability, reliable actuation, and rare spurious actuations. 
Many standards address reliability on a qualitative level 
by stating that the monitoring system must be a simple 
design to promote high reliability, use low maintenance 
subcomponents, and avoid false alarms. This paper 
addresses quantitative failure rates of tritium air monitors 
used in fusion research. These monitors may detect 
airborne tritium in elemental or oxide form.
II. MONITOR EXPERIENCES
To understand how tritium monitors are used in 
fusion facilities, we will look at monitor use in two 
facilities. At the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA) 
facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, staff 
members used fixed tritium monitors for personnel
protection and for building isolation in case of an airborne 
tritium release. These monitors were Kanne chamber type 
units that drew samples of room air into the chamber for 
readings of ion pairs created by beta decay. The TSTA 
monitors had three alarm levels. The first level was set at 
1 derived air concentration (DAC) of tritiated water vapor 
(HTO) in air, or 20 μCi/m3 at that time. At that alarm, all 
non-essential personnel would promptly evacuate the area 
and designated personnel would quickly investigate the 
alarm to determine if the alarm was genuine. The second 
alarm level was set at 5 DAC (100 μCi/m3). At the second 
alarm level, any investigators would also evacuate but 
could return if they donned appropriate protective gear. 
The third level alarm was set for 500 DAC (10 mCi/m3), 
which would sound an entire facility evacuation alarm 
and also isolate the TSTA building ventilation system.1
The system never reached the highest alarm and only 
rarely reached the middle alarm in the years that TSTA 
operated. The TSTA monitors were operated at an 
artificial background setting of 5 μCi/m3, slightly above a 
true zero reading, so that if an artificially low or erratic 
reading was caused by abnormal instrument drift or other 
malfunctions it would be notable to the operators. Either a 
Ba-133 or Cs-137 check source was used for monitor 
checks.1
In the Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) 
lab at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the two 
tritium monitors are the typical Kanne chamber type with 
room air drawn through the chamber. One of the monitors 
is shown in Figure 1. The STAR lab tritium air monitors 
have two alarm points: a low alarm at 0.5 DAC, which 
at STAR is 15 μCi/m3 HTO above nominal background, 
and a high alarm at 5 DAC (100 μCi/m3). The U.S. Code
Figure 1. Tritium room air monitor unit 
at the INL STAR laboratory.
of Federal Regulations presently defines the DAC for 
HTO vapor as 7E+05 Bq/m3 (18.9 μCi/m3) of air.
2
STAR personnel evacuate if the low level alarm 
sounds. Their procedure is to promptly evacuate the 
building, account for employees and visitors, and then use 
a cellular telephone or proceed to the nearest telephone in 
a nearby building to report the event to radiological 
control personnel and laboratory management.
The STAR instruments have functioned well and the 
staff members have confidence in them. The monitors are 
given a daily inspection, a weekly source check with a 
Cs-137 source, and a detailed calibration every 3 years. 
The 3-year calibration time window is longer than the 
typical 6-month or 1-year interval. The long calibration 
time interval is allowed because of the strict tracking of 
check readings during the weekly source checks (within 
±10% variance). If the instrument varies outside the ±10% 
range it must be recalibrated immediately at the health 
physics instrument lab. The procedure calls for 
transporting the electronics portion of the monitor to that 
lab to perform a bench test, which takes one day. If one of 
the two STAR monitors is being calibrated, the staff does 
not perform any major process evolutions at the facility.  
If there is cause for concern while one unit is gone then a 
radiological controls technician places a portable monitor 
unit in the room until the second STAR unit is returned.  
STAR does not have a spare tritium monitor on hand.
TABLE I. Tritium Air Monitor Hourly Failure Rates from Fusion Facilities
Facility Failure Mode
Failure Rate
(per hr)
Error Bound
(per hr) Reference
Tritium Process 
Laboratory (TPL)
Fail to function See below
a [4]
TPL Fail to function 1.1E05 2.5E05 [5]
TPL Fail to function 5.9E06 Not given [6]
Joint European 
Torus (JET)
Erratic/no output 8.8E07 4.2E06 [3]
TSTA Reads high or low 2.2E06 1E05 [1]
TSTA All modes 4.3E06 1.5E05 [1]
a. Using the failure count from [4], 13 failures of the tritium air monitoring system, and 7 monitors [6] operating for 19 
years = 13 failures/[7 monitors  19 yr  8760 hr/yr], gives a result of 1.1E05/monitor-hr as the point estimate failure 
rate. A standard error bound would be [1.1E05/(7 monitors  19 yr  8760 hr/yr)]0.5 or ±3E06/monitor-hr. The TPL 
value appears to be 1.1E05/hr. Combining this result by using a geometric mean with the JET “erratic/no output” and 
TSTA “all modes” values gives 3.5E06/monitor-hr with an upper bound of 4.7E06/monitor-hr.
III. DATA ASSESSMENT
The first mode of monitor failure described above, 
failure to operate, has been analyzed in several operating 
experience data sets.1,3–6 These data are given in Table I. 
The combined failure to function rate value from the three 
diverse data sets is estimated to be 3.5E06/monitor-hr 
with an upper bound of 4.7E06/monitor-hr. The failure 
to operate rate includes the detector, electronics, internal 
power supply, air flow, contamination, and air pump 
faults but does not include loss of electric power to the 
monitor unit.
The second failure mode is the failure of a monitor to 
alarm on demand, where demand is defined as a valid, 
actual situation that requires the monitor to alarm. As 
mentioned, tritium is usually effectively confined and 
there are consequently very rare demands to these 
monitors. As a generality, most monitor units in fusion 
usage do not experience enough demands to obtain a 
statistically significant failure rate for this failure mode. 
The data examined here (listed in Table II) are from 
tritium release tests and small operational releases at 
TSTA and STAR. All of the monitors addressed in these 
experiences are the most widely used Kanne chamber 
type, which draws room air into an ionization chamber by 
means of a small air pump.7
TSTA recorded a few operational release events.1,8
Due to some research regarding tritium movement in 
room air, there have also been several small-mass tritium 
release tests performed at TSTA9,10 and at the Tritium 
Process Laboratory (TPL) caisson facility at Tokai-mura
operated by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.11–13 The 
TPL tests documented in the literature were highlights 
from 70 tests with tritium release levels between 0.26 and 
26 GBq; the tritium monitor was out of order twice (did 
not function on demand) during that run of tests.14
The TSTA monitors were used in the large room tests 
to track tritium spread throughout the room and measure 
equilibration of the tritium concentration. In the smaller 
caisson tests at TPL, the monitor was used to measure the 
change in tritium concentration. The TPL caisson tests 
also used several “nude” ion chamber tritium monitors to 
detect tritium; those units were not included in the data set 
because they are a somewhat different instrument than the 
typical room air monitor that uses a pump and gas 
chamber. There have also been at least twelve very small 
leaks (< 1 mCi) of process tritium at the STAR 
laboratory. The STAR leak events have all been small 
amounts but have been more frequent than those at TSTA.  
The STAR events alone are not sufficient for statistical 
evaluation, but these events do contribute to a combined 
data set.  The small releases at STAR produced between 
15 and 80 μCi/m3 concentration ranges in room air, which 
was sufficient to alarm a monitor.  In these events, the 
challenged monitor functioned on demand, performing as 
TABLE II. Monitor Operational Data from Small Tritium Releases
Event/Test 
Designator
Tritium Released
(mCi)
Number of 
Monitors
Number of 
Releases
a
Reference
1  60 est. 8 1 [1]
2  60 est. 8 1 [1]
3 145 8 1 [8]
4 1,000 8 3 [9]
5 1,000 8 2 [10]
6 7 1 1 [11]
a
7 7.5 1 1 [12]
8 70 1 4 [13]
9 7–700 1 62 [14]b
10 < 1 1 12 INL STAR lab over  4 years
Release event totals 8(1)+8(1)+8(1)+8(3)+8(2)+1(1)+1(1)+1(4)+1(62)+1(12) = 144 monitor-demands
a. Note: There were six “nude” ion chambers on the caisson as well but those units were not included here.
b. There were two faults in the monitor over 10 years.  In the other listed release events, there were no monitor failures on 
demand.
intended. It is noted that the data in Table II constitute 
only a small set of data for a small number of tritium 
monitors but these are valid data of demands to monitors 
from actual tritium release conditions and the data can be 
used to estimate the monitor failure rate for failing to 
alarm on demand.
A statistical approach for calculating failure rates was 
outlined in Ref. 1, and is used here for demand failure 
rates.  The point estimate failure rate is the total number 
of failures on demand divided by the total number of 
demands for the data given in Table II.  
 = (total failure count)/(total demand count) (1)
The upper bound failure rate1 would be 
 = 2(0.95,2(n+1))/2D (2)
where
n = total failure count
D = total demand count.
The calculated chi-square distribution value for n=2 
is 12.592 for the 95% upper bound.15 Using this value and 
the demand count data from Table II, the tritium air 
monitor average failure rate for failure to alarm on 
demand is [2/144] = 1.39E02/demand with a 95% upper 
bound of [12.592/2(144)] = 4.372E02/demand.
The third failure mode, spurious alarms, has been 
known to occur with tritium monitors like other types of 
fixed monitors, but it is a somewhat rare event. For 
example, STAR experience is that a false alarm occurs at 
the facility perhaps once every 3 years, or 0.33/yr. 
Therefore, each of the two monitors has a spurious tritium 
alarm rate on the order of 0.17/yr. This appears to be a 
typical frequency estimate for a tritium research facility 
using a set of tritium monitors. The TSTA spurious 
alarms were also rare.1
The spurious alarm rate can vary with the age of the 
monitor, the age of the facility, the quantity of tritium 
used in the facility, the monitor manufacturer or brand 
name, and monitor recalibration frequency. There can be 
other factors for false alarms as well, including the 
monitor sensing radon gas rather than tritium,16 the 
presence of foreign vapors that cause the monitor to alarm 
(such as welding fumes),1 or the monitor sensing a non-
tritium beta-gamma emitter.  
The spurious alarm failure mode has not been 
investigated in any detail because such alarms err on the 
side of caution. Room or facility evacuations prompted by 
a spurious alarm are more of a nuisance and an operating 
cost burden than a safety issue—if the spurious alarms are 
infrequent enough so the staff does not become inured to 
the tritium alarms. In regard to human behavior when 
alarms sound, Proulx17 states that specialists in fire 
protection tend to agree that more than three nuisance or 
false alarms in a year undermine credibility of fire alarm 
systems and people tend to ignore the alarms. Certainly 
there is a higher level of professionalism in nuclear 
facility operations than in residential or public buildings, 
but if false alarms occurred with high frequency then 
workers may suspect a false alarm first and may not 
evacuate very quickly. The spurious alarm frequency 
noted at STAR is sufficiently low, and much lower than 
the valid alarm frequency from operational releases, so 
there is no concern about personnel responding correctly 
to an alarm.
IV. RESULTS COMPARISON
The military specification for reliability of fixed and 
portable tritium monitors states that the monitors shall 
have a mean-time between-failures of 3,000 hours or 
more (a failure rate of 3.3E04/hr or lower), and a mean 
corrective maintenance time to repair a monitor not 
exceeding 30 minutes (a mean time to repair of 0.5 hr).18
All values from the failure to function data given in 
Table I surpass that specification. The military 
specification does not give a value for failure to alarm on 
demand. Therefore, to check the validity of the value 
calculated here (1.39E02/demand), reliability values for 
other types of alarms were sought for comparison. Some 
monitor demand performance data were located for 
smoke detection systems used for fire protection in 
nuclear power plants.19 The failure of a smoke detector to 
alarm when challenged with a valid fire and smoke 
condition varied from 1E03/demand and even as low as 
1E05/demand for nuclear power station smoke detection 
systems. Because smoke detection is an engineered 
system to protect human health and safety, these 
performance values are believed to be generally 
comparable to the tritium air monitor results. The nuclear 
power plant smoke detection system not only sounds a 
local alarm for personnel evacuation, but it will also 
signal for ventilation shut down, smoke control system 
actuation (e.g., close smoke dampers), and actuation of 
water flow to “dry pipe” sprinkler systems if such systems 
are used in the facility. Thus, the nuclear power plant 
smoke detection system has similar functions to the 
tritium air monitoring system. The upper end of the 
nuclear fission power plant rate was about fourteen times 
less than the tritium monitor results. Because tritium 
monitors are believed to be reliable, it is possible that 
with more tritium release tests the calculated tritium air 
monitor failure to alarm on demand value would decrease 
further and be more comparable to the upper end of the 
nuclear power plant smoke detection system value of 
1E03/demand.
Another type of monitor that is important for 
personnel safety is a nuclear criticality alarm system. A 
literature search revealed little data about the reliability of 
these detectors, but a recent purchase contract 
specification cited an acceptable range for failure to alarm 
on demand of 1E02 to 1E03/demand and a spurious 
alarm rate of < 0.1 event/year.20 A vendor study gave a 
failure to alarm on demand value of 1.7E03/demand
with a 1-year test interval, and 1.3E04/demand rate for a 
1-month test interval.  The spurious alarm frequency for a 
criticality alarm system was given as 0.05/year.  
Criticality alarm systems are intended for personnel and 
public safety; a criticality alarm not only signals for a 
quick evacuation of workers to evade prompt radiation 
exposure, but also actuates a lockdown of facility 
ventilation and de-energizes processes so there are no
activated material releases to the environment. For the 
criticality alarm systems, apparently a 1E02 to 
1E03/demand failure rate range is considered adequate 
for personnel safety when the rarity of a nuclear criticality 
event is taken into account. The tritium monitor value of 
1.3902/demand calculated here is just outside the 1E02 
to 1E04 range given for a criticality alarm system. This 
is a surprisingly good result given that the tritium monitor 
data are sparse. However, the INL staff hold confidence
in these units as equipment that operates well, suggesting 
that longer operation times will result in continued correct 
operation and lower demand failure rates.  The STAR 
tritium monitor spurious alarm rate was estimated to be 
greater than that of criticality monitors, which are not 
prone to false alarms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Fixed monitoring for airborne tritium is necessary for 
personnel safety. Examination of monitor failure rates for 
failing to operate has yielded a combined value of 
3.5E06/monitor-hr with an upper bound of 
4.7E06/monitor-hr. This is a factor of  94 below the 
published quantitative reliability level of 
3.3E04/monitor-hr stated in a military standard. The 
issue of monitors sounding a valid alarm has also been 
examined. The tritium release tests that have been 
conducted in fusion tritium facilities not only provided 
valuable information about tritium movement and 
behavior within buildings and enclosures, but have also 
produced a set of demand trials that exercised the tritium 
monitors used in these facilities. Two of the tritium 
monitors were noted to have failed in this compilation of 
tests and operational releases. The test data are recognized 
to be sparse, but the data described in Table II constitute a 
larger data set than has been readily available for these 
monitors in the past. Statistical treatment of these test data 
gave a failure to alarm on demand failure rate of 
1.4E02/demand, with an upper bound failure rate of 
4.4E02/demand. In comparison to other types of 
monitors having the same types of requirements to 
provide for personnel safety, it was found that the value 
for tritium air monitors was  14 times higher than 
nuclear power plant smoke detection monitor systems (a 
poor comparison over 10 times) and a factor of 1.4 higher 
than the specified reliability range for a nuclear criticality 
alarm system (a good comparison within three times). 
This was a good result considering the small data set. 
Because the INL staff trusts the tritium air monitors to 
give proper responses and the operating experience they 
have witnessed leads them to conclude that the monitors 
are reliable, it is suggested that additional tritium monitor 
operation would yield lower demand failure rates than the 
1.4E02/demand calculated here. Monitors sounding 
spurious or unwanted alarms has not been treated in detail 
but operating experiences indicate the value should be on 
the order of 0.1 or 0.2/monitor-yr, which was greater than 
cited values for other monitors but is still a low value.
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